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Introduction 
To "Secure America’s Promise as a Nation of Immigrants,"1 in 2002, 
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
engineered a new procedure requiring all applicants for U.S. citizenship to 
undergo an enhanced Federal Bureau of Investigation background name 
check (FBI name check).2  Six years later, despite the stated aims of this 
procedure—"enhanc[ing] national security"3 and maintaining the "integrity 
of the immigration system"4—its implementation spawned two 
problems:  (1) a massive backlog of hundreds of thousands of applications5 
and (2) allegations of racial discrimination against individuals of Muslim, 
Arab, Middle Eastern, and South Asian descent.6 
                                                                                                                 
 1. EDUARDO AGUIRRE JR., U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., USCIS STRATEGIC PLAN:  SECURING AMERICA’S PROMISE 1 (2005), 
http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/USCISSTRATEGICPLAN.pdf. 
 2. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., A REVIEW OF U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS. ALIEN SECURITY CHECKS 3–4 (2005), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_06-06_Nov05.pdf (noting the newly formed 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ first goal was to "ensure the security and 
integrity of the immigration system" by instituting FBI name checks); see also The Post-9/11 
Visa Reforms and New Technology:  Achieving the Necessary Security Improvements in a 
Global Environment:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations & Terrorism of the 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 14–20 (2003) (statement by David Hardy, Acting 
Assistant Director, Records Management Div., Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_senate_hear 
ings&docid=f:92725.pdf (describing the FBI name check process); see generally FBI, 
National Name Check Program, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/nationalnamecheck.htm (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2010) ("The National Name Check Program’s (NNCP’s) mission is to disseminate 
information from FBI files in response to name check requests received from federal 
agencies . . . [and] to determine whether a specific individual has been the subject of or 
mentioned in any FBI investigation(s).") (alteration in original) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 3. CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION SERVS. OMBUDSMAN, DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOMB 
_Annual_Report_2007.pdf  [hereinafter CIS 2007 REPORT]. 
 4. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
RESPONSE TO THE CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES.  OMBUDSMAN’S 2007 ANNUAL 
REPORT 7 (2008), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/USCISO_Thematic_Response_2007_ 
FINAL_OMB_cleared.pdf [hereinafter RESPONSE TO CIS 2007 REPORT]. 
 5. CIS 2007 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11–20; see also RESPONSE TO CIS 2007 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 2–4 (discussing the backlog problem and its future impact on 
immigration). 
 6. See, e.g., CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, NEW YORK UNIV. SCH. OF 
LAW, IRREVERSIBLE CONSEQUENCES:  RACIAL PROFILING AND LETHAL FORCE IN THE "WAR 
ON TERROR" 18 (2006), http://www.chrgj.org/docs/CHRGJ%20Irreversible%20 
Consequences%20June%202006.pdf ("Profiling of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians has 
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As the former Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman (CIS 
Ombudsman) noted in January 2008, this backlog crisis has become so 
severe that it now "may be the single biggest obstacle to the timely and 
efficient delivery of immigration benefits."7  The empirical data 
demonstrates the severity of this problem.8  In 2007, the delayed 
applications surged to more than 93,359, which resulted in a total of 
329,160 individuals experiencing significant naturalization delays.9  The 
overall numbers of processed applications skyrocketed.10  In addition to the 
surge in backlogged applicants, the USCIS collectively processed more 
than 1.3 million applications, with the numbers in March 2007 increasing 
by more than sixty-four percent from September 2006.11 
This surge has resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of federal 
lawsuits filed to compel the USCIS to resolve these delays.12  The federal 
courts continue to grapple with the legality of the FBI name check 
procedures.13  Although this area of law remains unsettled, non-citizens 
                                                                                                                 
increased dramatically in the U.S. and elsewhere since . . . September 11, 2001, with 
widespread reports of prejudice, harassment and attacks."); see also AMNESTY INT’L, 
THREAT AND HUMILIATION:  RACIAL PROFILING, DOMESTIC SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (2004), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/racial_profiling/ 
report/rp_report.pdf (noting the expansion in a number of groups frequently targeted by 
racial profiling); see also Karen C. Tumlin, Suspect First:  How Terrorism Policy Is 
Reshaping Immigration Policy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1173, 1177, 1227–37 (2004) (noting the 
need to "assess the spillover effects that terrorism policy is having on our national immigrant 
and immigration policy as well as on immigrants—both those here and those waiting to 
come," and further analyzing how terrorism policy has shaped immigration policy since 
September 11, 2001). 
 7. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS. OMBUDSMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT HIGHLIGHTS 2 (2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
CISOMB_Annual_Report_2007.pdf. 
 8. See id. ("As of May 2007, USCIS reported 329,160 FBI name check cases 
pending; [a]pproximately 64% (211,341) of those cases have been pending more than 90 
days and approximately 32% (106,738) have been pending more than one year."). 
 9. Id.; see also CIS 2007 REPORT, supra note 3, at 14 (itemizing the most recent data 
on overall immigration patterns across the United States for 2007). 
 10. See CIS 2007 REPORT, supra note 3, at 14 (finding 1,316,740 "pending 
applications not included in ‘Backlog’"). 
 11. See id. (noting 1,237,823 "pending applications not included in ‘Backlog’" in 
September 2006 and 1,316,740 "pending applications not included in ‘Backlog’" in March 
2007, which is approximately a sixty-four percent increase). 
 12. See THE AM. IMMIGR. L. FOUND., http://www.ailf.org/lac/ clearing 
house_mandamus.shtml (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Recent Mandamus Litigation] 
(citing to and explaining the numerous FBI name check delay cases canvassing the United 
States) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 13. See Memorandum from Michael Aytes, Assoc. Dir., Domestic Operations, U.S. 
Citizen and Immigration Servs. on Revised Nat’l Sec. Adjudication & Reporting 
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continue to rely exclusively on domestic statutes to effectuate naturalization 
and to challenge the immigration system.14  What federal courts have yet to 
consider is the possibility that these delays may implicate the United States’ 
obligations under international law.15  A report prepared by the Center for 
Human Rights and Global Justice at New York University School of Law 
(NYU Report)16 raised this issue in April 2007.17  The NYU Report 
contends that the FBI name check delays may violate U.S. law18 and 
international law19 because the process profiles "immigrants perceived to be 
Muslim, Arab, Middle Eastern, or South Asian on the basis of their name, 
race, religion, ethnicity, or national origin."20  The NYU Report also claims 
that the delays violate binding U.S. obligations to non-citizens under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)21 and the 
                                                                                                                 
Requirements to Field Leadership 2 (Feb. 4, 2008), http://www.greencard 
lawyers.com/news/2008/AdjustmentApplications%20.pdf (stating that if "the FBI name 
check request has been pending for more than 180 days, the adjudicator shall approve the 
application and proceed with the card issuance"). 
 14. See generally Recent Mandamus Litigation, supra note 12 (displaying an 
expansive database list of old and new cases across the United States involving FBI name 
check delays that relied exclusively on domestic statutes for relief). 
 15. See CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, 
AMERICANS ON HOLD:  PROFILING, CITIZENSHIP, AND THE "WAR ON TERROR" 4 (2006), 
http://www.chrgj.org/docs/AOH/AmericansonHoldReport.pdf [hereinafter NYU REPORT] 
(finding "[d]elays in the citizenship process implicate discrimination on grounds that are 
prohibited under international law" because "[u]nder international law, policies that impose a 
disproportionate burden on particular groups (either purposely or in effect) must be justified 
in order not to constitute prohibited discrimination"). 
 16. See id. at 2 (basing the report on research conducted by New York University 
(NYU) School of Law’s Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (CHRGJ), the 
International Human Rights Clinic, and the Immigrant Rights Clinic, in close collaboration 
with the Council of People’s Organization (COPO) in Brooklyn, New York). 
 17. See id. (analyzing the FBI name check delays and their impact on Muslim, Arab, 
Middle Eastern, and South Asian descent). 
 18. See id. at 25 ("[C]itizenship delays may violate U.S. law, including, for example, 
section 555(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act."). 
 19. See id. at 31 ("The importance of the right to be infringed by disproportionate 
name checks, combined with the lack of effectiveness and other detrimental consequences, 
render such a disproportionate burden unjustified and illegal under international law."). 
 20. Id. at 2. 
 21. Int’l Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (entered into force Mar. 
23, 1976) (adopted by the United States Sept. 8, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR], available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm (last visited May 13, 2010) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
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International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD).22 
This Note seeks to contribute to the discussion on this topic by 
evaluating the NYU Report’s conclusions.23  Contrary to the NYU Report, 
analysis of the United States’ international and domestic legal obligations 
produces the following conclusion:  delays caused by the FBI name check 
procedures do not place the United States in violation of its obligations.24  
This analysis reveals a fatal flaw in the NYU Report’s methodology, which 
stems from a failure to consider all the applicable reservations, 
understandings, and declarations (RUDs).25  These RUDs reveal a different 
landscape of legal obligation than the abstract assessment that lies at the 
foundation of the NYU Report.26  To support this conclusion, this Note 
analyzes the relevant ICCPR and CERD treaty provisions in light of the 
applicable RUDs and the political context in which the United States 
undertook each obligation.27 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Int’l Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. 
Res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966) 
(entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) (adopted by the United States Oct. 21, 1994) [hereinafter 
CERD], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see also NYU REPORT, 
supra note 15, at 25–26 (discussing the "[c]itizenship delays for the profiled group also 
implicate a number of international human rights protections guaranteed to non-citizens," 
including the ICCPR and the CERD). 
 23. See NYU REPORT, supra note 15, at 37–39 (concluding that the name check 
procedure invites discrimination that is illegal under international law.  It also recommends 
ways the United States can "live up to its international human rights obligations and its 
democratic ideals and end discrimination and undue delays in the naturalization process"). 
 24. See infra Part I (explaining that the FBI name check procedures do not violate 
international laws); see also infra Part VI (discussing the FBI name check procedures and 
the United States’ domestic obligation). 
 25. See infra Part I (highlighting the fact that the NYU Report does not mention the 
United States’ reservations, declarations, or understandings to the ICCPR or the CERD in 
reaching its conclusion on the United States’ treaty violations). 
 26. Compare NYU REPORT, supra note 15, at 25–30 (arguing that the United States’ 
actions violate international law while failing to mention the United States’ reservations, 
declarations, or understandings), with infra Part I (explaining that the United States’ use of 
RUDs is a compromising mechanism enabling ratification of HRTs while keeping intact the 
domestic rights structure under the U.S. Constitution and discussing why the United States’ 
RUDs to HRTs would not place the FBI name check delays in direct violation of 
international obligations). 
 27. 138 CONG. REC. S4783 (1992) [hereinafter U.S. RUDs to ICCPR]; 140 CONG. 
REC. S7634-02 (daily ed. June 24, 1994) [hereinafter U.S. RUDs to CERD], available at 
http://www1.umn.edu /humanrts/usdocs/racialres.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
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This Note is divided into seven parts.  Part I begins by detailing the 
limitations of the United States’ obligations under international human 
rights law.  Part II establishes the United States’ ICCPR nondiscrimination 
obligations.  This is accomplished by scrutinizing the confusing textual 
provisions of the treaty, delineating the scope of the United States’ RUDs, 
and expounding on the conflicts between the United States and the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC), which serves as the enforcement body of the 
treaty.  Part III analyzes the enforcement mechanisms and the remedies 
available under the ICCPR.  It further explains how the United States’ 
obligations under the ICCPR, circumscribed by the applicable RUDs, 
hinder enforcement and redress for injured parties.  Part IV establishes the 
United States’ CERD nondiscrimination obligations. It also deciphers a 
complex citizenship exception unveiled by the interplay of the textual 
provisions, and describes the competing interpretations by the United States 
and the CERD Committee, which serves as the enforcement body of the 
treaty.  Part V explores why the United States’ reservations under the 
CERD likewise prevent relief for persons alleging impermissible 
discrimination.  Part VI discusses the limited reach of the ICCPR and the 
non-existent application of the CERD in domestic courts.  It focuses on the 
federal courts’ deference to the non-self-execution declarations and to the 
plenary power doctrine on immigration.  Finally, this Note concludes by 
exploring the future implications of the delays caused by the FBI name 
check process. 
I.  The Limits of the United States’ Obligations Under International Human 
Rights Law 
Since World War II, the United States has played a commanding role 
in transforming human rights treaties (HRTs) from mere rhetoric into 
binding international law.28  Historically, treaty drafters frequently utilized 
the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights as a model for constructing many of 
the HRTs currently in use.29  To date, the United States remains committed 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See Michelle Friedman, The Uneasy U.S. Relationship with Human Rights 
Treaties:  The Constitutional Treaty System and Nonself-Executing Declarations, 17 FLA. J. 
INT’L L. 187, 189 (2005) (discussing the historical backdrop of the United States’ role in 
bringing these treaties to fruition). 
 29. See John Quigley, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1287, 1308–09 (1993) (noting examples of other 
treaties such as the Torture Convention and the Race Convention). 
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to advancing HRTs to an extent.30  The restrictions placed on the United 
States’ support and obligations stem from a fundamental clash between the 
U.S. constitutional system and the expansive rights articulated within most 
HRTs to gain broader adherence by the international community.31  To 
resolve the inconsistencies between the United States and HRTs regarding 
the structure, scope, and substance of rights, RUDs became a requirement 
in all HRTs ratified by the United States since the 1970s.32  
Over the years, many within the international community have 
condemned the United States’ consistent use of RUDs.33  Critics cite the 
United States’ perceived double standard of supporting HRTs but 
conditioning its support through the use of RUDs.34  Despite the opposition, 
the United States’ use of RUDs remains a common feature of its accession 
to international legal obligations since the inception of the republic more 
than two hundred years ago.35  Moving into the post-9/11 landscape, RUDs 
may have gained even more importance in the United States with the 
growing concerns over terrorism and national security.  Indeed, RUDs 
preserve the U.S. constitutional structure, which provides the President with 
the flexibility to make swift decisions in times of war and national 
emergency without interference by international organizations.36 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See id. ("It thus seems anomalous [after the United States had such influence on 
the process] that once these rights are affirmed in a solemn document like the Covenant, the 
United States should seek to protect itself."). 
 31. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and 
Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 400 (2000) (analyzing this clash in greater 
detail). 
 32. See id. at 400–01 ("The RUDs address each of the challenges outlined above."); 
see also David N. Cinotti, The New Isolationism:  Non-Self-Execution Declarations and 
Treaties as the Supreme Law of the Land, 91 GEO. L.J. 1277, 1278 (2003) (highlighting the 
U.S. Senate’s consistent pattern of attaching RUDs to "every major human rights treaty to 
which it has given its advice and consent since World War II"). 
 33. See Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights 
Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 347, 351–53 (2000) (explaining the double standard approach by 
the United States and the negative reaction by other countries). 
 34. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law and the United States 
Double Standard, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 365, 366 (1998) (noting that "the United States does not 
embrace the international human rights standard that it urges on others"); see also Roth, 
supra note 33, at 352 (highlighting the double standard approach). 
 35. See Kevin C. Kennedy, Conditional Approval of Treaties by the U.S. Senate, 19 
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 89, 91, 97 (1996) (noting that over the last two hundred 
years, the United States has entered into more than 12,000 bilateral and multilateral 
agreements and ratified approximately fifteen percent with the inclusion of RUDs). 
 36. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, The Unexceptional U.S. Human Rights RUDs, 3 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 311, 313 (2005) ("[T]he United States made clear its understanding that certain 
provisions that it did consent to . . . were no more stringent than analogous rules under the 
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II.  U.S. Nondiscrimination Obligations Under the ICCPR 
Several years after the United States ratified the ICCPR with the 
inclusion of RUDs,37 the HRC sought to limit the reach of RUDs submitted 
by state parties regarding nondiscrimination treaty provisions.38  But the 
HRC’s aim at compliance has proven challenging for two reasons:  the 
flexible design of the ICCPR provisions, and the RUDs submitted by state 
parties.39  These challenges have led to a modern day tug-of-war between 
the HRC and the state parties as to the precise nature of these 
nondiscrimination obligations.40 
Scholars often rely on a blend of ICCPR provisions and HRC 
recommendations when analyzing the United States’ ICCPR obligations.41  
                                                                                                                 
U.S. Constitution."); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 400–01 (stating that many 
treaties pose problems to the U.S. constitutional system, specifically in terms of substance, 
scope, and structure, and that RUDs alleviate these domestic concerns and allow the U.S. to 
ratify these treaties). 
 37. See ICCPR, supra note 21, at 1 (ratifying the ICCPR on Mar. 23, 1976). 
 38. See Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24(52), U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994), reproduced in Senate Report, 34 I.L.M. 839, 840–41 
(1995) [hereinafter HRC General Comment 24(52)], available at http://www1.umn.edu/ 
humanrts/gencomm/hrcom24.htm (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice).  The HRC General Comment states: 
As of 1 November 1994, 46 of the 127 States parties to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights had, between them, entered 150 
reservations of varying significance to their acceptance of the obligations of the 
Covenant. Some of these reservations exclude the duty to provide and guarantee 
particular rights in the Covenant. Others are couched in more general terms, 
often directed to ensuring the continued paramountcy of certain domestic legal 
provisions. Still others are directed at the competence of the Committee. The 
number of reservations, their content and their scope may undermine the 
effective implementation of the Covenant and tend to weaken respect for the 
obligations of States parties. 
Id. 
 39.  See Sarah Joseph, A Rights Analysis of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
5 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 57, 91 (1999) (explaining that the uncertainty surrounding the 
construction of the ICCPR and state party reservations to the ICCPR created "a clear tension 
between the classical view of treaties creating bilateral and multilateral relations between 
States, which informs the customary law of reservations, and the modern view that human 
rights treaties essentially create bilateral relations between ‘State parties’ and individuals"). 
 40. See id. ("If the customary law reflected in the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion and the 
Vienna Convention applies to the ICCPR, incompatible reservations unfortunately render the 
ICCPR wholly void in the reserving State."). 
 41. See NYU REPORT, supra note 15, at 25–31 (relying on a blend of ICCPR 
provisions, HRC Recommendations, and CERD provisions to define the nature and the 
scope of human rights protections owed to non-citizens by the United States under its treaty 
obligations). 
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Despite the advancements made by scholars in addressing this issue, a 
subtle problem has emerged.  The HRC and scholars consistently rely on a 
selective mix of ICCPR provisions and on supporting documentation that 
largely exclude RUDs to justify their positions.42  This Part adjusts that 
selective framework and reestablishes the United States’ ICCPR 
nondiscrimination obligations through the explicit text of the ICCPR and 
the United States’ RUDs.43  A three-part analysis accomplishes this end by 
reviewing the textually confusing articles of the ICCPR, analyzing how the 
United States solved this confusion through RUDs, and explaining the 
rationale for the United States’ legal use of FBI name check procedures. 
A.  Textual Confusion 
Three ICCPR articles encompass the uneven nondiscrimination 
provisions at issue.  Those articles are Article 2, Article 4, and Article 26.  
Specifically, Article 2 articulates a restrictive provision that state parties 
shall ensure the rights of all individuals without making "distinction[s] of 
any kind regarding race, colour . . . religion . . . or national origin," among 
others.44 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See id. (relying largely on ICCPR provisions to outline the obligations of the 
United States). 
 43. Despite claims made by the NYU Report, greater attention is needed to address 
this complex and unclear issue. 
 44. See ICCPR, supra note 21, at art. 2, which states: 
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure 
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status. 
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each 
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in 
accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the 
present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to 
give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant. 
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are 
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has 
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto 
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by 
any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and 
to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; 
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when 
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Next, Article 4 permits a state party to derogate from its normal 
ICCPR obligations during a time of national emergency.45  But this 
derogation is limited.  A state party can only take measures that are 
consistent with its obligations under international law and measures that do 
not involve discrimination based "solely" on the grounds of "race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, or social origin."46 
Finally, Article 26 states that all persons are "equal before the law" and 
entitled to "equal protection of the law" without discrimination.47  Article 
26 is qualified by a second phrase that extends additional rights to "all 
persons."48  This phrase guarantees "equal and effective protection against 
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour . . . religion . . . [or] 
national origin."49 
At first glance, these three provisions appear to circumscribe the 
boundaries of state party obligations with discrimination.  A careful study 
of these provisions, however, unmasks significant textual gaps that may 
undermine the intended restrictions on these provisions.  These textual gaps 
                                                                                                                 
granted. 
 45. See ICCPR, supra note 21, at art. 4, which states: 
1. In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the 
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present 
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present 
Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations 
under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground 
of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin . . . . 
3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of 
derogation shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the present 
Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the reasons by 
which it was actuated. A further communication shall be made, through the 
same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such derogation. 
 46. Id.; Compare ICCPR, supra note 44, at art. 2 (protecting against "discrimination 
on any ground" (emphasis added)), with ICCPR, supra note 45, at art. 4 ("[D]iscrimination 
solely on the ground." (emphasis added)), and ICCPR, infra note 47, at art. 26 ("[W]ithout 
distinction of any kind."), for closer evaluation of this issue. 
 47. See ICCPR, supra note 21, at art. 26, which states: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination 
to the equal protection of the law.  In this respect, the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection 
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.  
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render a state party’s obligations under the ICCPR unclear, which may in 
turn translate to a valid justification for the United States’ use of an FBI 
name check procedure under the ICCPR. 
More specifically, two examples demonstrate the confusion 
surrounding this issue and illustrate why the FBI name check procedures 
are consistent with ICCPR obligations.  First, treaty drafters used the term 
"distinction" in Article 2, which they juxtaposed with the term 
"discrimination" in Article 4 and in Article 26.50  The subtle variation infers 
that a state party can derogate from its obligation under Article 4 and can 
utilize a program that does not discriminate based "solely" on "race, 
colour . . . religion or social origin."51  Therefore, if all of the Article 4 
requirements are satisfied, the United States may be justified in utilizing 
FBI name check procedures that have an unfortunate "discriminating" 
effect.52 
Article 26 provides the second example.  The drafters constructed 
Article 26 with two key phrases:  "equal before the law" and "equal 
protection of the law," which are not listed as non-derogation rights in 
Article 4.53  In conjunction, the nondiscrimination terms contained within 
Article 2 are limited by Article 4,54 but these terms are absent in Article 
26.55  This juxtaposition reveals a possible exception for state parties to 
adopt differing standards of treatment for non-citizens and citizens.  In 
context, this implies that the United States can continue performing FBI 
name checks without violating its ICCPR treaty obligations. 
                                                                                                                 
 50. See id. at art. 4 (regarding the comparison of the terms "distinctions" and 
"discrimination" within the three ICCPR articles). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Compare ICCPR, supra note 47, at art. 26 ("[R]ace, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."), 
with ICCPR supra note 45, at art. 4 ("[R]ace, colour, sex, language, religion or social 
origin."), to evaluate the list of terms stated in Article 26 that are not stated as non-
derogating rights within Article 4. 
 54. See ICCPR, supra note 45, at art. 4 (referring to the Article 4 restrictive exception 
"solely" during national emergencies). 
 55. Compare ICCPR, supra note 44, at art. 2 (stating that the state shall protect against 
"discrimination of any kind, such as" (emphasis added)), with ICCPR, supra note 47, at art. 
26 ("[P]rotection against discrimination based on any ground."), and ICCPR, supra note 45, 
at art. 4 (stating that the state can discriminate under certain circumstances so long as it 
"does not involve discrimination solely on" certain grounds), to see the Nondiscrimination 
terms in play and how they are limited by Article 4, but remain absent from the provisions in 
Article 26. 
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B.  Confusion to Clarity:  The United States’ RUDs 
The uncertainty produced by internal inconsistencies in the text of the 
ICCPR was not lost on the Senate.  In 1992, the Senate addressed the 
textual confusion when it considered whether to give advice and consent for 
the ratification of the ICCPR.56  In fulfilling its advice function, the Senate 
included several RUDs.57  The Senate also included an explanation of how 
the ICCPR provisions correspond with U.S. law.58  The Senate explained 
that Article 2, Article 4, and Article 26 "do not precisely comport with 
long-standing Supreme Court doctrine in the equal protection field."59  
Accordingly, the Senate emphasized that U.S. law permits discrimination 
between "citizens and non-citizens and between different categories of non-
citizens, especially in the context of the immigration laws."60 
Citing to a formal HRC interpretation, the Senate reiterated its belief 
that the ICCPR’s inherent flexibility may permit the adoption of different 
procedures based on nationality and other justifications.61  This 
interpretation stated that "identical treatment in every instance" is not 
mandated by the ICCPR.62  The Senate reinforced that if the distinctions 
made under U.S. law are reasonable, objective, and related to a purpose 
under the ICCPR, they would not violate the United States’ treaty 
obligations.63  Thus, "distinctions," as defined under Article 2 and Article 
26, are "permitted" when they are at a minimum "rationally related to a 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. REP. NO. 102-23, at 22 (1992), reprinted in 
31 I.L.M. 645, 654–55 (1992) ("The very broad anti-discrimination provisions contained in 
the above articles [2, 4, and 26] do not precisely comport with longstanding Supreme Court 
doctrine in the equal protection field."). 
 57. U.S. RUDs to ICCPR, supra note 27, at 1 ("[T]he Senate’s advise and consent to 
the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . . . subject to the 
following Reservations, Understandings, Declarations and Proviso."). 
 58. See id. (noting several exceptions and clarifications, including for example, "[t]hat 
because U.S. law generally applies to an offender the penalty in force at the time the offence 
was committed, the United States does not adhere to the third clause of paragraph 1 of 
Article 15"). 
 59. S. REP. NO. 102-103, supra note 56, at 22. 
 60. Id. (emphasis added). 
 61. See id. (citing to the HRC’s General Comment). 
 62. Id. ("In its General Comment on Nondiscrimination, for example, the Committee 
noted that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing does not mean identical 
treatment in every instance."). 
 63. See id. (recommending a specific interpretation of the United States’ treaty 
obligations). 
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legitimate governmental objective."64  In addition, under Article 4, the 
Senate reasoned that discrimination based "solely" on the factors articulated 
within this article will not "bar distinctions" that render disproportionate 
effects on people of a certain status.65  Finally, the Senate emphasized that 
the United States’ ICCPR obligations are defined by RUDs submitted at 
ratification and the explanations of how those RUDs comport with U.S. 
law.66 
C.  Rhetoric Revolt:  HRC Conflictions to State Party RUDs 
Two years later, the HRC responded with General Comment 24(52) to 
limit the reach of the RUDs submitted by the United States and forty-six 
other countries.67  The HRC’s efforts, however, had the opposite effect.  
Rather than tempering the reach of the United States’ RUDs, General 
Comment 24(52) gave the United States an opportunity to respond, clarify, 
and discuss the limitations of its perceived obligations.68  Through three key 
misstatements within General Comment 24(52), this section explains the 
United States’ plausible justification for continuing the FBI name check 
procedure without violating the ICCPR. 
The first issue with General Comment 24(52) involves the HRC’s 
claim to legally binding authority over state parties regarding the 
interpretation of treaty reservations.69  The HRC explained that when a state 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. ("The United States further understands the prohibition in paragraph 1 of 
Article 4 upon discrimination, in time of public emergency, based ‘solely’ on the status of 
race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin not to bar distinctions that may have a 
disproportionate effect upon persons of a particular status."). 
 66. See id. ("In a few instances, however, it is necessary to subject U.S. ratification to 
reservations, understandings or declarations in order to ensure that the United States can 
fulfill its obligations under the Covenant in a manner consistent with the United States 
Constitution."). 
 67. See HRC General Comment 24(52), supra note 38, 34 I.L.M. at 844 (discussing 
the 150 reservations of varying significance submitted by state parties upon ratification of 
the ICCPR). 
 68. See Observations by the United States on General Comment 24, 3 INT’L HUM. RTS. 
REP. 265, 269 (1996) [hereinafter U.S. Response] (discussing five specific concerns of the 
United States regarding General Comment 24(52)).  See generally Observations by the 
United Kingdom on General Comment 24, 3 INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 261, 261–69 (1996); 
Observations by France on General Comment 24 on Reservations to the ICCPR, 4 INT’L 
HUM. RTS. REP. 6, 6–8 (1997); United Nations Int’l Law Comm’n U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/52/10 (1997). 
 69. See HRC General Comment 24(52), supra note 38, 34 I.L.M., at 844 (stating that a 
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party submits a reservation that stands against the interpretation of the 
HRC, this reservation will be considered "contrary to" the object and 
purpose of the ICCPR.70  The United States noted that this "surprising 
assertion" infers that the HRC has the ability to render legally binding 
interpretations over state parties.71  This presents a fundamental problem 
because the ICCPR does not extend this power to the HRC.72  As the United 
States explained, ICCPR drafters "could have given the Committee this role 
but deliberately chose not to do so."73  The United States therefore does not 
recognize the HRC as a binding legal authority to judge the validity of its 
RUDs to the ICCPR.74 
Instead, the United States reaffirmed its adherence to the principles of 
customary international law reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, which is widely held as the primary standard on treaty 
interpretation.75  The HRC disagreed with this reasoning and explained that 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was "inadequate" and 
"inappropriate" to address unique problems associated with the ICCPR.76  
                                                                                                                 
reservation to an obligation under the ICCPR does not affect a state’s duty to comply with its 
substantive obligations under the treaty).  
 70. Id. 
 71. See U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 266 (noting that it would be a departure from 
the ICCPR’s scheme for the HRC to have the authority to bind states to its interpretations of 
the treaty). 
 72. See ICCPR, supra note 21 (lacking any provisions within the fifty-three articles of 
the ICCPR that give the HRC this authority); see also U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 266 
(stressing that the HRC does not have binding legal authority); see also Joseph, supra note 
39 (explaining that "HRC findings are not legally binding, unlike those of international 
judicial bodies like the International Court of Justice or the European Court of Human 
Rights"). 
 73. U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 267 (emphasis added).  
 74. See id. at 269 (rejecting the proposition that the HRC can sever reservations it 
deems invalid by stating that the United States’ reservations are integral to its consent to be 
bound by the ICCPR). 
 75. See id. at 266 (noting that the Vienna Convention has established rules of treaty 
interpretation that the Committee seems to reject); see generally Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf. 
 76. See HRC General Comment 24(52), supra note 38, 34 I.L.M. at 845 (discussing 
the HRC’s reasons for not relying on the Vienna Convention).  The HRC stated: 
The Committee believes that its provisions on the role of State objections in 
relation to reservations are inappropriate to address the problem of reservations 
to human rights treaties. Such treaties, and the Covenant specifically, are not a 
web of inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations. They concern the 
endowment of individuals with rights. The principle of inter-State reciprocity 
has no place, save perhaps in the limited context of reservations to declarations 
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In addition, the HRC reiterated that it would now be regarded as the 
supreme authority on interpreting whether a state party’s RUDs are 
"compatible with the object and purpose" of the ICCPR.77  Although the 
HRC may have good reason for claiming this role, its reasoning conflicts 
with the ICCPR’s overall scheme, and therefore violates international law.78  
Moreover, the HRC realistically has only persuasive power and lacks the 
authority to dictate to sovereign states the methodology for treaty 
interpretation, particularly when that methodology is inconsistent with the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.79 
A second issue involves the role of international peremptory norms80 
in ICCPR reservations.81  The HRC maintains that when a reservation 
conflicts with established international peremptory norms, the reservation 
automatically will be regarded as incompatible with the object and purpose 
of the ICCPR.82  The United States does not question this assertion.83  
Rather, the United States questions whether a state party has the 
freedom to exclude "one means of enforcement of particular norms by 
reserving against inclusion of those norms in its Covenant 
obligations."84  This issue remains unclear within international law.85  
                                                                                                                 
on the Committee’s competence under article 41. And because the operation of 
the classic rules on reservations is so inadequate for the Covenant, States have 
often not seen any legal interest in or need to object to reservations. 
Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 266 (discussing the role of the HRC in 
interpreting reservations and treaty terms). 
 79. See U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 266 (noting the HRC’s lack of authority to 
render binding interpretations and reinforcing that the HRC appears to reject the rules of 
treaty interpretation in the Vienna Convention). 
 80. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 702 cmt. n (1987) (defining international peremptory norms, often termed "jus cogens" 
[which translates in English to "compelling law"] as baseline fundamental principles of 
international law recognized by the international community, which cannot be derogated 
from).  These universal norms include:  genocide, slavery, and murder as a state policy.  See 
id. §§ 702(a)–(c). 
 81. See U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 268 (highlighting the peremptory norms 
relevant to the object and purpose of the treaty). 
 82. See HRC General Comment 24(52), supra note 38, 34 I.L.M. at 842 (stating that 
the reservations that offend peremptory norms are not compatible with the Covenant). 
 83. See U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 267 ("It is clear that a State cannot exempt 
itself from a peremptory norm of international law by making a reservation to the 
Covenant."). 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. ("It is not at all clear that a State cannot choose to exclude one means of 
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Accordingly, the United States maintains that the HRC does not have the 
ability under international law to render binding judgments within this 
context.86  Until this area of international law is developed, the United 
States believes that it remains consistent with its ICCPR obligations 
when it reserves against the inclusion of specific norms.87 
Additionally, the United States criticized the HRC’s narrow per se 
approach that invalidated all reservations conflicting with international 
peremptory norms or the object and purpose of the ICCPR.88  The HRC 
does not have the power to make these assertions in this context either.89  
Instead, customary international law provides the appropriate test.90  
This test regarding the object and purpose analysis on non-derogated 
rights in treaty reservations requires full consideration of the entire 
treaty and the specific rights and provisions at issue on a case-by-case 
basis.91  A subtle problem emerges, however, with application to the 
ICCPR because the treaty lacks an explicit reference to an accepted 
object and purpose test regarding interpretation.92  Therefore, the default 
guide in this situation is customary international law, which favors the 
United States’ approach.93  
A third issue involves a fundamental disagreement between the 
HRC and the United States over a precise definition of the object and 
purpose of the ICCPR.94  The HRC narrowly interprets the ICCPR’s 
                                                                                                                 
enforcement of particular norms by reserving against inclusion of those norms in its 
Covenant obligations."); see also Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 307, 
355–63 (2006) (discussing the clash in perspectives on this issue between the Special 
Rapporteur for the International Law Commission and the HRC). 
 86. See U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 266 (stating that the HRC lacks authority to 
render binding judgments and interpretations). 
 87. See id. at 267 (stating that a liberal view of reservations would secure the widest 
possible adherence to the ICCPR, which is the primary object and purpose of the Covenant). 
 88. See id. at 267 (noting that the HRC’s approach is unsupported by international 
law). 
 89. See id. at 266 (reinforcing that the HRC lacks the binding legal authority to decide 
this issue). 
 90. See id. at 267 (arguing that the HRC’s per se approach is contrary to international 
law). 
 91. See id. (recognizing that an analysis of non-derogable rights requires consideration 
of the specific treaty, right, and reservation at issue). 
 92. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 434 ("Unlike other human rights 
treaties, including one of the optional protocols to the ICCPR (which the United States has 
not ratified), the ICCPR contains no clause excluding reservations and no reference to the 
object and purpose test."). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 267 (comparing the different definitions 
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object and purpose as a "legally binding standard for human rights" 
when any type of reservation to a critical provision of the treaty 
undermines its object and purpose.95  The United States adheres to a 
broader understanding.96  It construes the ICCPR’s object and purpose to 
"protect human rights," as defined by the understanding that immediate 
and universal implementation of all provisions is not required.97  To this 
end, the United States believes that the object and purpose of the ICCPR 
are focused on gaining wide adherence by the international community 
to a basic standard of civil and political rights.98 
In sum, analysis of these three issues explains why the HRC has 
limited power to interpret the scope of the United States’ RUDs.  These 
limitations are relevant because the HRC would lack the ability to 
compel the United States to change its policy regarding the FBI name 
check procedure unless this policy stood in contrast to the overall object 
and purpose of the treaty or to international peremptory norms. 
III.  ICCPR International Enforcement Mechanisms and Remedies 
This Part explores the clash between the United States and the 
HRC, which is the enforcement body of the ICCPR.99  This Part also 
                                                                                                                 
of the object and purpose of the Covenant). 
 95. See HRC General Comment 24(52), supra note 38, 34 I.L.M. at 842 (stating 
that the underpinning behind the Covenant is to create human rights standards by 
defining civil and political rights and making them binding obligations on state parties). 
 96. See U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 267 (stating that the narrow 
interpretation of the Committee is unsupported by international law). 
 97. See id. (defining the object and purpose of the Covenant to be protection of 
human rights, and dismissing the idea that "any reservation to any substantive provision 
necessarily contravenes the Covenant’s object and purpose") (emphasis added). 
 98. See id. ("In fact, a primary object and purpose of the Covenant was to secure 
the widest possible adherence, with the clear understanding that a relatively liberal 
regime on the permissibility of reservations should therefore be required."). 
 99. See ICCPR, supra note 21, at art. 28 (establishing the HRC and its 
composition).  This article states: 
1.  There shall be established a Human Rights Committee (hereafter referred to 
in the present Covenant as the Committee).  It shall consist of eighteen members 
and shall carry out the functions hereinafter provided.  2. The committee shall be 
composed of nationals of the States Parties to the present Covenant who shall be 
persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of 
human rights, consideration being given to the usefulness of the participation of 
some persons having legal experience.  3. The members of the Committee shall 
be elected and shall serve in their personal capacity. 
Id. 
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analyzes the fundamental problem with the HRC’s structure, its design, 
and its application to the United States’ RUDs.  Then, it concludes by 
arguing that individuals and state parties have no means of recovery 
against the United States for FBI name check delays. 
Article 40 is the primary line of ICCPR enforcement for a state 
party.100  This article requires a state party to submit periodic reports 
documenting its progress with implementing the ICCPR.101  The HRC 
responds to state periodic reports with its own report documenting a 
state party’s progress.102  Normally, a back-and-forth constructive 
dialogue forms, which usually results in greater adherence to the 
ICCPR.103  This is not always the case.  If a state party refuses to 
change a conflicting policy, the HRC lacks any legal or physical 
ability to force compliance.104  This leaves the HRC with limited 
recourse.105  As one scholar correctly noted, "[B]ad publicity is the 
only sanction for a State that blatantly ignores the [HRC’s] 
findings."106 
If the HRC demanded that the United States change its FBI name 
check policy, the United States could simply reject this suggestion 
without any real consequences.  The United States would likely take 
this precise course of action because it has worked successfully in 
other contexts.107 
                                                                                                                 
 100. See id. at art. 40 (requiring state parties to submit reports on the measures that they 
have adopted to comply with the ICCPR for review and response by the HRC). 
 101. Id. at art. 40(1). 
 102. Id. at art. 40(4). 
 103. See Joseph, supra note 39, at 65–66 (reinforcing that the fundamental purpose 
behind this dialogue is to improve the adherence by all state parties). 
 104. See Ineke Boerefijn, Towards a Strong System of Supervision:  The Human Rights 
Committee’s Role in Reforming the Reports Procedure Under Article 40 of the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 766, 772 (1995) (noting that the aim is to form a 
"constructive dialogue" between the state parties and the HRC). 
 105. See Joseph, supra note 39, at 66 (stating that the "HRC findings are not legally 
binding, unlike those of international judicial bodies like the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) or the European Court of Human Rights"); see also U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 
266 (reinforcing the HRC’s lack of binding authority). 
 106. See id. (stating that some state parties will outright reject recommendations by the 
HRC and refuse to adhere due to soft international law enforcement policies). 
 107. See U.S. STATE DEP’T, UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO SELECTED 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE (2007), http://www.state.gov/docu 
ments/organization/100845.pdf (highlighting the issue of extraterritorial application of the 
ICCPR and the United States’ firm disagreement with the HRC and no further consequence 
for this disagreement).  The United States specifically stated at the outset of this response 
that it takes "this opportunity to reaffirm its long-standing position that the Covenant does 
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The second mechanism for ICCPR enforcement against a state 
party is Article 41.108  This article permits a state party to file formal 
ICCPR complaints against another state party for treaty violations.109  
But this article’s application against the United States proves 
unrealistic for two reasons:  a state party would not jeopardize its 
relationship with the United States over an internal U.S. immigration 
policy and Article 41 has never been used by a state party.110 
A third state party enforcement mechanism is the First Optional 
Protocol.111  It provides individuals with redress against a state party.112  
For this protocol to work, the state party in question must ratify this 
protocol.113  The United States has not ratified it; so this option is 
useless.  Thus, all three redress options prove ineffective. 
IV.  U.S. Nondiscrimination Obligations Under the CERD 
Two years after ratifying the ICCPR,114 the United States ratified 
another multilateral treaty, the CERD, to reinforce its commitment to 
nondiscrimination.115  The United States included numerous RUDs to 
                                                                                                                 
not apply extraterritorially."  Id. at 1 (emphasis added).  Additionally, the United States 
maintains that it "respectfully disagrees with the view of the Committee that the Covenant 
applies extraterritorially."  Id.  As noted from this long-standing position of the United 
States, it has suffered no repercussions in relation to its disagreement with the HRC.  Id. 
 108. ICCPR, supra note 21, at art. 41. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Peter G. Danchin, U.S. Unilateralism and the International Protection of 
Religious Freedom:  The Multilateral Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 33, 92 
(2002) (explaining that although the optional inter-state procedure in Article 41 falls within 
the Human Rights Committee’s area of operation it has never been used). 
 111. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 
Dec. 1966, U.N.T.S., vol. 999, p. 171, art. 1 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976) [hereinafter 
ICCPR Optional Protocol], available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3 
bf0.html (last visited Feb. 5 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
 112. See id. ("A State Party . . . recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive 
and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be 
victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant."). 
 113. See id. at art. 9(2) (stating that the Protocol will enter into force three months after 
ratification). 
 114. See ICCPR, supra note 21 (noting that the United States adopted the ICCPR in 
1992). 
 115. See CERD, supra note 22, preamble (outlining the goal of eliminating all forms of 
racial discrimination).  
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most CERD provisions.116  The international community reacted 
skeptically to this and questioned the United States’ commitment to 
nondiscrimination.117  The thrust behind this skepticism stemmed from 
the blurring effect RUDs had on defining the United States’ CERD 
obligations.118  Therefore, in application to the FBI name check policy, 
uncertainty remains regarding whether some legal distinctions under this 
policy qualify as illegal discrimination under the CERD.119  The NYU 
Report focused on this exact point.120  It argued that the United States 
violated the CERD through FBI name check delays that target non-
citizens within the Muslim, Arab, Middle Eastern, and South Asian 
communities.121  The United States addressed similar concerns in its 
annual report to the CERD Committee, but declined to state that 
government actions were in violation of the treaty.122  Instead, it 
                                                                                                                 
 116. U.S. RUDs to CERD, supra note 27 (referencing the formal document listing the 
RUDs submitted by the United States upon ratification of the CERD). 
 117. International scholars take issue with the United States’ ratification of the CERD 
with the accompaniment of the non-self-executing doctrine.  See, e.g., Gay J. McDougall, 
Toward a Meaningful International Regime:  The Domestic Relevance of International 
Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 40 HOW. L.J. 571, 588 (1997) 
(noting that the United States’ ratification of the CERD with non-self-executing provisions 
"further exposes the U.S. to justifiable claims of hypocrisy at the international level"); see 
also Nkechi Taifa, Codification or Castration? The Applicability of the International 
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination to the U.S. Criminal Justice 
System, 40 HOW. L.J. 641, 650 (1997) (stressing that it is "politically expedient for the 
United States to ratify" HRT’s with RUDs in the event that this "practice not only restricts 
these treaties’ impact in the United States, but nullifies their effect. This self-serving policy 
has continued through the Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations"). 
 118. See Taifa, supra note 117, at 651 (reasoning that this may be due to the United 
States attaching certain RUDs "to all human rights treaties ratified by the U.S., 
including . . . provisions which might be in conflict with the U.S. Constitution"). 
 119. See NYU REPORT, supra note 15, at 25 (referring to the deliberate distinction 
between citizens and non-citizens because less protection is provided for those discriminated 
against based on their non-citizen status). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. (stating that "[c]itizenship delays for the profiled group also implicate a 
number of international human rights protections guaranteed to non-citizens," and further 
explaining that the United States is "obligated to ensure Nondiscrimination in access to 
citizenship").  The NYU Report consistently relies on the CERD Committee’s general 
recommendations throughout its discussion to argue for clear U.S. obligations under this 
context.  Id. 
 122. See Periodic Report of the United States of America to the U.N. Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination Concerning the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, paras. 53–54, delivered to the U.N. 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Apr. 2007) [hereinafter CERD 
Periodic Report],  available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/cerd_report/83404.htm ("Thus, 
despite significant progress, numerous challenges still exist, and the United States 
RHETORIC TO REALITY 467 
acknowledged the "on-going challenges" that still exist in this area and 
explained that government institutions charged with eliminating 
discrimination are making "significant progress" despite considerable 
work that remains in fixing this difficult issue.123 
Building upon the preceding discussion, this Part focuses on the 
difference between distinctions and discrimination under the United 
States’ CERD obligations relating to FBI name check delays.  This Part 
also unmasks a citizenship exception found within Article 1, Article 2, 
and Article 5.  The analysis then explores the CERD Committee’s 
reaction and the United States’ response.  Finally, this Part applies this 
framework to the FBI name check delay issue. 
A.  Unmasking the Citizenship Exception 
The analysis in this section considers the inherent problems with 
the CERD’s expansive definition of "racial discrimination."124  It is 
possible that the original CERD drafters never considered that Article 1 
might be used to provide state parties with a citizenship exception.125  
For example, the initial Third Committee of CERD drafters structured 
Article 1(2) as a broad exception to the CERD, which allows a state 
party to make "distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or 
preferences . . . between citizens and non-citizens." 126  Accordingly, the 
United States could use this language to make three legal distinctions 
that do not rise to the level of discrimination. 
                                                                                                                 
recognizes that a great deal of work remains to be done."). 
 123.  See id. at para. 53 (drawing out why these challenges exist within the United 
States). 
 124. See Patrick Thornberry, Confronting Racial Discrimination:  A CERD 
Perspective, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 239, 254 (2005) (explaining that because an exact 
definition was not incorporated under Article 1, the Convention has, in turn, left the CERD 
Committee with an opening to "their interpretation [of] developments in the human rights 
cannon"). 
 125. See id. at 251 ("The ground of ‘national origin’ generated considerable discussion 
in the drafting of the Convention, but has not unduly troubled the Committee in practice."). 
 126. See WARWICK MCKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 156–157 (Oxford:  Clarendon Press (1983)) (referencing that the Third Committee set 
forth this provision to "make clear" that discrimination based on alien status would not be 
prohibited nor condemned) (citing UN docs. A/C3/L 1238; A/6181, particularly ¶¶ 30–37; 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/335 ¶¶ 38–39). 
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Alienage is one way the United States could distinguish 
individuals.  The term "alienage" remains absent from Article 1,127 and 
therefore operates outside the discrimination definition stated in the 
CERD.128  The CERD Committee would object to this narrow 
interpretation; instead, it would construe Article 1 to include alienage.  
Under this interpretation, the CERD Committee would then claim that 
the FBI name check policy amounts to discrimination and violates the 
CERD.  The CERD Committee may have a valid argument under this 
logic.  But it lacks the ability to hold the United States accountable 
through law or through physical force. 
Article 1(3) provides a second way the United States could 
distinguish individuals.129  The United States could utilize the national 
security exception or the alternative grounds exception to justify its 
actions.130  Specifically, Article 1(3) states that "[n]othing in this 
Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal 
provisions of State Parties concerning nationality, citizenship, or 
naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against 
any particular nationality."131  This implies that discrimination is 
prohibited against "any particular nationality."132  Yet, this rhetoric 
remains silent on alternative grounds for discrimination, and Article 1(3) 
omits the term "nationality" in its definition.133  The United States thus 
has a strong argument for distinguishing individuals based on other 
grounds, such as national security, while complying with its CERD 
obligations. 
                                                                                                                 
 127. See CERD, supra note 22, at art. 1(3) ("Nothing in this Convention may be 
interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning 
nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate 
against any particular nationality."). 
 128. See Theodor Meron, The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 283, 311–12 
(explaining the exception based on citizenship according to Article 1); see also MCKEAN, 
supra note 126, at 157–58 ("The exception of aliens qua aliens from the enjoyment on an 
equal footing of human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the Convention is a 
clear restriction on the universality of the principle of equality."). 
 129. See CERD, supra note 22, at art. 1 (referring to nationality and naturalization as 
distinguishing characteristics). 
 130. See NYU REPORT, supra note 15, at 12–13 (explaining that the justification of 
"national security" is commonly cited through jurisprudence on this issue in federal district 
and appellate courts throughout the thirteen circuits by the USCIS and the FBI). 
 131. CERD, supra note 22, at art. 1(3). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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A third way the United States could distinguish individuals is by 
limiting its CERD obligations to citizens only.134  This is possible 
through a combination of Article 2, Article 5, and Article 1.135  At the 
outset of this analysis, focus must be directed to the placement and to 
the implication of the term "everyone" in Article 5.136  The syntax 
structure of Article 5 comports with Article 2 and with the overall 
consistency of the CERD.137  This suggests that the Article 5 
introductory statement concerning the elimination of discrimination "in 
all its forms" folds back into a dialogue with Article 1(2), its definitions, 
and its subsequent paragraphs—namely, the citizen and non-citizen 
distinction.138  As such, this analysis reveals the possibility that the 
United States could legally distinguish non-citizens by limiting its 
obligations under the CERD to only citizens.139 
In sum, Article 1 does not protect non-citizens from distinctions 
made within the United States’ FBI name check policy.  Article 1 
instead provides three ways the United States could make legal 
distinctions without violating the CERD.  Although there is a possibility 
that treaty drafters overlooked the citizenship exception, this remains 
unlikely because no state party would relinquish its sovereign power 
over internal citizenship policies to the governing committee of a 
multilateral international treaty organization.140 
                                                                                                                 
 134. See Meron, supra note 128, at 312–13 (noting the scope and the complications 
added by Article 5); see also Karl Josef Partsch, Elimination of Racial Discrimination in the 
Enjoyment of Civil and Political Rights, 14 TEX. INT’L L.J. 191, 197–98 (highlighting the 
necessity of interpretation of Article 5, Article 2, and Article 1 together with the CERD). 
 135. See generally CERD, supra note 22, at arts. 1, 2, 5. 
 136. CERD, supra note 22, at art. 5. 
 137. See Meron, supra note 128, at 312 ("Arguably, then, despite the broad language of 
Article 5, state parties may limit their obligations under Article 5 to citizens if this limitation 
is not a pretext for racial discrimination."). 
 138. See Partsch, supra note 134, at 197–98 (discussing the interpretation of the Article 
5 phrase "in all its forms"). 
 139. See Meron, supra note 128, at 312 (confirming that a state party to the CERD 
could validly make distinctions based solely on citizenship under Article 5).  This option 
assumes that the United States’ aim was not racially motivated and is justified by an 
alternative explanation.  Id.  Additionally, it is important to note that the CERD has a very 
liberal scope on the permissibility of citizenship restrictions.  Id.   
 140. See MCKEAN, supra note 126, at 158 (stating that, regarding alien exclusion under 
the CERD, a "clear restriction on the universality of the principles of equality [of 
aliens] . . . is made inevitable by the existence of the principle of sovereign states"). 
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1.  CERD Committee Response 
In response to the broad structure of the CERD, most state parties 
included RUDs that limited their treaty obligations.  This frustrated the 
CERD Committee.  In 1996, the CERD Committee responded by issuing 
General Recommendation Fourteen to curb the increased use of RUDs 
by state parties.141  General Recommendation Fourteen advanced a new 
test for deciding when state parties’ "distinctions" violate the CERD.142  
The test analyzed whether a state party’s actions had an "unjustifiable 
disparate impact" on a particular group as defined by "colour, descent, 
or national or ethnic origin."143 
In 1997, the CERD Committee went a step further to regulate 
RUDs.  This time it enacted General Recommendation Thirty144 with 
two goals:  tempering state parties’ RUDs and regulating state parties’ 
naturalization processes.145  The recommendation also defined the 
parameters between distinctions based on citizenship and distinctions 
based on discrimination.  The CERD Committee explained that these 
parameters would focus on actions that are "not applied pursuant to a 
legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this 
aim."146  The new standard became the lens through which the CERD 
Committee would view and interpret state party obligations, regardless 
of existing RUDs.147 
                                                                                                                 
 141. See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, General Recommendation 
14:  Definition of Discrimination, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/48/18 (1993), [hereinafter General 
Recommendation XIV], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/84ab9690ccd8 
1fc7c12563ed0046fae3 (stating that the aim is to further define what constitutes a distinction 
versus discrimination by drawing "attention of States parties to certain features of the 
definition of racial discrimination in Article 1, paragraph 1") (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, General Recommendation No. 
30:  Discrimination Against Non Citizens, preamble (Jan. 10, 2004) [hereinafter General 
Recommendation XXX] available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/ doc.nsf/0/e3980a673769e229 
c1256f8d0057cd3d?Opendocument (addressing discrimination against non-citizens) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 145. See id. (reaffirming and recommending analysis under Article 5 concerning the 
application of discrimination to non-citizens). 
 146. Id. para. 4 (emphasis added). 
 147. See id. (defining discrimination against non-citizens). 
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2.  U.S. RUDs, Periodic Reports, and the Clarifications 
Despite the CERD Committee’s new "unjustifiable disparate 
impact" standard, the United States qualified its acceptance with a 
modified legal framework.148  The United States explained that an 
"unjustifiable disparate impact" would occur only when a race-neutral 
practice demonstrated "statistically significant racial disparities and are 
unnecessary, i.e. unjustifiable."149  In addition, the United States 
included an equal protection prong, which increased the standard for 
proving this impact, and further insulated the United States from 
liability.150 
With the United States’ modified framework in place, analysis 
shifts to its application for FBI name check delays.  The reality of 
applying this framework is met with two significant roadblocks:  one is 
that state parties have not ever used this test; the other is that the 
increasing efforts by the USCIS to correct this problem decreased its 
impact compared to the overall naturalization numbers.151  Thus, while 
citizenship delays are important and are in need of correction, this 
situation appears unlikely to reach a level sufficient to trigger an 
international treaty violation in which the United States or the CERD 
Committee would invoke this test.152 
                                                                                                                 
 148. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination:  Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103d Cong. 19 (1994) 
[hereinafter International Convention Hearing] (statement of Conrad K. Harper, Legal 
Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State) (reinforcing this premise); see also CERD Periodic Report, 
supra note 122, para. 318 ("[I]n seeking to determine whether an action has an effect 
contrary to the Convention [the Committee] will look to see whether that action has an 
unjustifiable disparate impact." (internal quotations omitted)). 
 149. See CERD Periodic Report, supra note 122, para. 318 (defining unjustifiable 
disparate impact). 
 150. See General Recommendation XXX, supra note 144 (expounding upon the legal 
differences between the United States’ framework and the CERD’s framework under this 
context). 
 151. See CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. OMBUDSMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., ANNUAL REPORT 2007 11–16 (2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
CISOMB_Annual_Report_2007.pdf (discussing delays and backlogs in 2007); see also 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. OMBUDSMAN, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL 
REPORT 2008, 5–18 (2008), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOMB_Annual_Report_ 
2008.pdf (denoting the most recent report on the continuing challenges with this issue). 
 152. See generally CERD Periodic Report, supra note 122.  This 2007 periodic report 
to the CERD Committee does not acknowledge or discuss this issue.  Instead, the only 
inference is the continuous problem that the United States acknowledges with racial tensions 
for people of Muslim descent.  Id.  There is no discussion within the entire document of any 
issue regarding the background delays and discrimination.  Id.  However, the United States 
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B.  Possible Application of the Citizenship Exception 
Taking the analysis a step further, this section explores what could 
happen if the FBI name check delays reached a level from which the 
CERD Committee found an "unjustifiable disparate impact."153  If this 
occurred, the CERD Committee would likely submit a periodic 
recommendation report to the United States stressing that the FBI name 
check delays violated the CERD.  The CERD Committee would ask the 
United States to correct this problem.  The United States would then 
have three options:  (1) to accept the CERD Committee’s 
recommendations; (2) to acknowledge the issue, but take no action to 
rectify the problem; or (3) to outright reject the CERD Committee’s 
request. 
Option one is unviable.  The reason stems from the United States’ 
regard for the CERD Committee as merely "recommendatory in 
nature."154  Options two and three, however, remain viable for several 
reasons.  First, the United States is working to eliminate the citizenship 
delays.155  Second, the United States has a Citizenship and Immigration 
Services Ombudsman in place to correct troubling citizenship 
situations.156  It therefore remains unlikely that the U.S. government 
                                                                                                                 
does, in fact, make clear, on its own accord, that there still exists wide-spread discrimination 
in the wake of 9/11 against people of Muslim, Arab, Middle Eastern and South Asian 
descent.  Id.  The United States notes that they are committed to solving this issue, but there 
is never any discussion of FBI name check delays, nor any issue of an "unjustifiable 
disparate impact."  Id. 
 153. See International Convention Hearing, supra note 147, at 19 (reinforcing this 
premise); see also CERD Periodic Report, supra note 122, para. 318 (discussing the 
unjustifiable disparate impact standard). 
 154. See International Convention Hearing, supra note 147, at 15 (pertaining directly 
to the discussion of state party RUD’s within General Recommendation 14). 
 155. See CERD Periodic Report, supra note 122, para. 54 (discussing the need for 
continued progress).  
 156. CIS Ombudsman Website Under the Department of Homeland Security, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0482.shtm (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  Within this 
website the Ombudsman states: 
The Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman (CIS Ombudsman) 
provides recommendations for resolving individual and employer problems with 
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). As mandated 
by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 452, CIS Ombudsman is an 
independent office that reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Homeland 
Security. The CIS Ombudsman: 
• Assists individuals and employers in resolving problems with USCIS; 
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would allow recommendations from an international organization to 
trump its own efforts.157 
In addition, review of this issue and its application to other similar 
contexts suggests that there would be minimal consequences if the 
United States took no action or rejected the CERD Committee’s 
recommendation.158  In the past, the United States disregarded CERD 
recommendations and suffered no backlash.159  The plausible 
explanation for defiance with no consequences comes from the CERD 
Committee’s inability to render binding legal judgments or to force 
compliance.160  Accordingly, the CERD Committee’s authority would be 
confined to political pressure and persuasive rhetoric.161 
V.  CERD International Enforcement and Remedies 
On the international stage, nearly all of the CERD enforcement 
mechanism options prove useless against the United States.  The CERD 
provides three options for redress covering both state parties and 
individuals.162  On a state level, redress is found under Article 11 and 
                                                                                                                 
• Identifies areas in which individuals and employers have problems in 
dealing with USCIS; and 
• Proposes changes to mitigate identified problems. 
Id.  See generally Noël L. Griswold, Forgetting the Melting Pot:  An Analysis of the 
Department of Homeland Security Takeover of the INS, 39 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 207 (2005) 
(exploring and analyzing the newly established Department of Homeland Security). 
 157. See generally CERD Periodic Report, supra note 122 (discussing United States’ 
efforts to combat racial discrimination). 
 158. Like the ICCPR, drafters of the CERD do not give any binding legal authority to 
the CERD Committee.  Rather, the CERD Committee’s role, as generally stated in Article 9, 
Section 2, is to make "suggestions and general recommendations based on reports and 
information received from the State Parties."  CERD, supra note 22, at art. 9; see also 
William F. Felice, The UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination:  Race, and Economic and Social Human Rights, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 205, 217 
(2002) (stating that the CERD Committee’s function is not a judicial body but rather a 
mechanism to guide states in their efforts to support their work toward integration of the 
CERD and ameliorating discrimination). 
 159. See Felice, supra note 158, at 216–17 (discussing the United States’ failure to 
achieve a standard of living called for by CERD). 
 160. See id. at 218 (discussing the CERD Committee’s past "flimsy and ineffectual 
reports"). 
 161. See id. at 217 (discussing non-judicial role of CERD). 
 162. See generally CERD, supra note 22, at arts. 11, 14, 22. 
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Article 22.163  On an individual level, Article 14 provides redress to non-
state parties.164 
Beginning with Article 11, state parties can submit complaints to 
the CERD Committee against another state party for noncompliance 
with the treaty.165  This option has never been used.166  Therefore, a state 
party would likely not jeopardize its relations with the United States 
over an internal U.S. citizenship policy.167 
Article 22 provides a second option.  It enables state parties to 
submit claims to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).168  Similar to 
Article 11, this option also remains problematic in application against 
the United States.  The problem stems from the United States’ 
reservation in Article 22, which requires its consent before a claim 
proceeds to the ICJ.  Unfortunately, the United States has never 
consented to the use of Article 22, nor has any other state party.169  
Although an Article 22 claim is still possible, reality dictates that its 
success is unlikely.  This is especially the case with internal U.S. 
policies like the FBI name check delays.170 
                                                                                                                 
 163. CERD, supra note 22, at arts. 11, 22 (granting state remedies). 
 164. CERD, supra note 22, at art. 14, para. 5 ("In the event of failure to obtain 
satisfaction from the body established or indicated in accordance with paragraph 2 of this 
article, the petitioner shall have the right to communicate the matter to the Committee within 
six months."). 
 165. See CERD, supra note 22, at art. 11 (discussing state reporting options). 
 166. There is no record in any official or unofficial report of any state party to the 
CERD using Article 11. 
 167. See International Convention Hearing, supra note 148, at 15 (discussing 
citizenship policy).  CERD Articles 12 and 13 are attached to this provision and set forth the 
outline for determining how the CERD Committee and the United Nations would approach 
this situation if a claim ever arose.  CERD, supra note 22, at arts. 12, 13. 
 168. See CERD, supra note 22, at art. 22 (allowing interpretation or application 
questions to be appealed to International Court of Justice). 
 169. See International Convention Hearing, supra note 147, at 14–15 (denoting Conrad 
K. Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State’s comment that the Clinton Administration 
"strongly supports" use of international dispute mechanisms but for prudence and for 
practicality rationales, Advisor Harper stressed that the best course of action is to set in place 
a layer of protection to shield it from frivolous or politically motivated attacks by other 
countries). 
 170. See FBI, National Name Check Program—Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/nationalnamecheck.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) (explaining the 
National Name Check Program) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights and Social Justice). 
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Finally, Article 14 provides the only enforcement and redress 
procedure for individuals.171  It requires a state party’s consent before a 
case can advance.172  If the state party does not consent, no further relief 
exists.173  The United States has not consented to this Article; therefore, 
it remains an ineffective redress option.174  In sum, CERD enforcement 
mechanisms in Article 11, Article 22, and Article 14 prove useless 
against the United States for FBI name check delays. 
VI.  Domestic Applications and Enforcement of the ICCPR and the CERD 
On the domestic stage, it is nearly impossible to advance FBI name 
check delay discrimination claims under the ICCPR or the CERD.  This 
Part explains why by analyzing the challenges associated with two 
hurdles resurrected by the United States.  The first section of this Part 
addresses how federal courts treat the non-self-executing declarations 
operating within both treaties.175  The second section of this Part 
explores the plenary power doctrine and the deference federal courts 
give to the United States on immigration issues.176  Finally, this Part 
concludes by arguing that redress under either treaty is unlikely now or 
in the future.177 
A.  The Non-self-execution Hurdle 
At the outset, the United States believes that existing domestic laws 
provide sufficient protection against discrimination for citizens and for 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See CERD, supra note 22, at art. 14 (discussing the possible redress option for 
individuals). 
 172. See id. at art. 14, para. 1 ("No communication shall be received by the Committee 
if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration."). 
 173. See id. ("A State Party may at any time declare that it recognizes the competence 
of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals or groups of 
individuals within its jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation by that State Party of 
any of the rights set forth in this Convention. No communication shall be received by the 
Committee if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration."). 
 174. See Felice, supra note 157, at 215–16 (noting that in Advisor Conrad’s speech he 
explained that the United States never consented to this provision and therefore it cannot be 
bound by it). 
 175. Infra Part VI.A. 
 176. Infra Part VI.B. 
 177. Infra Part VI.C. 
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non-citizens.178  Accordingly, the Senate ratified the ICCPR and the 
CERD as non-self-executing to prevent international treaty claims from 
conflicting with domestic laws.179   The Supreme Court has upheld this 
non-self-execution doctrine consistently for more than 150 years.  
Recently in 2008, the Supreme Court renewed its commitment to this 
doctrine in Medellín v. Texas.180  In Medellín, the majority stressed that 
the "long recognized" distinction given to non-self-executing 
international treaties is that it has no effect in the United States without 
a congressional statute.181  The Court reasoned that the objective of non-
self-execution is political, not judicial.182  Congress must pass legislation 
before a treaty becomes "a rule for the Court."183  With no legislation 
                                                                                                                 
 178. See Senate Report, supra note 56, at 22–26 (discussing and explaining this issue). 
For example, the Senate Report clarified that because the ICCPR was a non-self-executing 
treaty, it "would not . . . become directly enforceable as United States law in U.S. courts."  
Marian Nash, U.S. Practice:  Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 719, 726 (1994).  Moreover, the Senate Report also 
noted that the "U.S. already provides extensive protections and remedies against racial 
discrimination sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the present convention."  Id.  Finally, 
the Senate Report also noted: 
For reasons of prudence, we recommend including a declaration that the 
substantive provisions of the Covenant are not self-executing.  The intent is to 
clarify that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S. Courts.  
As was the case with the Torture Convention, existing U.S. law generally 
complies with the Covenant; hence, implementing legislation is not 
contemplated. 
Senate Report, 31 I.L.M. at 656. 
 179. See id. (stating that non-self-executing treaties "would not . . . become directly 
enforceable as United States law in U.S. courts"). 
 180. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008) (discussing this long-standing 
precedent).  Moreover, writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts upheld the doctrine of 
non-self-executing provisions within international treaties and he further explained that it is 
not binding on federal and state courts.  In support of this holding, the Medellín Court cited 
to the Court’s finding in Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 315 (1829) that a non-self-executing 
treaty was not binding.  Id.  See generally United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833); 
and Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1988). 
 181. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 504–05. 
 182. See id. at 508 (noting that a non-self-executing treaty created an obligation for the 
political branches to take action to comply with the United States’ commitments and it was 
not directly enforceable as federal law). 
 183. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 516 (stating "[t]he point of a non-self-executing treaty is 
that it ‘addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must 
execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court’" (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 
27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829))). 
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passed pertaining to the ICCPR or the CERD, a plaintiff would find it 
nearly impossible to circumvent the non-self-executing hurdle.184 
B.  The Nonexistent CERD Claim and the Rare ICCPR Claim 
Yet, there are always exceptions within every legal system.  Although 
no exceptional cases have advanced when brought under the CERD, some 
isolated cases have advanced under the ICCPR. But those cases did not 
make it far, as demonstrated by three lines of reasoning below. 
One line of reasoning comes from Article 50.  It states that the ICCPR 
"extend[s] to all parts of the federal states without any limitations or 
exceptions."185  Beazley v. Johnson186 illustrates a failed attempt at using 
Article 50.187  There, the plaintiff argued that the United States consented to 
Article 50 through ratification of the ICCPR, and therefore the United 
States was bound by this provision.188  The court described that reasoning 
as "nonsensical, to say the very least."189  The court subsequently dismissed 
the claim that certain articles would supersede the Senate’s non-self-
executing provision to the ICCPR.190 
A second line of reasoning claims the ICCPR is self-executing (instead 
of non-self-executing).  This claim is also meritless as the Fifth Circuit’s 
holding in Beazley also illustrates.191  According to the court, this claim 
would never make it far because there is no case law to support such an 
obscure contention.192 
A third line of reasoning relies on the HRC’s non-binding 
interpretation of United States’ obligations under the ICCPR.  In Beazely, 
                                                                                                                 
 184. As of February 17, 2009, Congress has not passed legislation extending rights 
under the ICCPR or the CERD. 
 185. ICCPR, supra note 21, at art. 50. 
 186. See Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 573 
(2002) (finding that a violation of the Vienna Convention did not dismiss the defendant’s 
indictment). 
 187. See id. 
 188. See id. at 267 ("Beazley claims that this declaration is trumped by article 50."). 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. at 266 ("[I]n Domingues v. Nevada, the Supreme Court of Nevada 
concluded that ‘the Senate’s express reservation of the United States’ right to impose a 
penalty of death on juvenile offenders negate[d] Domingues’ claim that he was illegally 
sentenced’ . . . .  We agree. " (citing Domingues v. Nevada, 114 Nev. 783, 785 (1998))). 
 191. See id. (rejecting the conclusion that provisions of the ICCPR voided state law). 
 192. See id. at 267 (denoting the court’s overall reasoning in dismissing petitioner’s 
claim). 
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the petitioner claimed that U.S. obligations should be determined by the 
HRC and not by the United States’ non-self-executing doctrine.193  The trial 
court found that this approach was procedurally barred and without merit.194  
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit also dismissed this reasoning.  It cited a lack of 
supporting authority.195  Regardless of this exceptional application, most 
federal courts continue deferring to the United States through the non-self-
execution doctrine.196 
C.  Immigration Plenary Power Preclusion 
The federal courts also defer to immigration laws and policies 
established by Congress and the Executive Branch.  This section explains 
how this deference impacts a possible ICCPR or CERD claim citing 
discrimination from FBI name check delays.  Finally, this section elaborates 
on state parties and individual’s lack of success in challenging this 
deference. 
When the Senate originally crafted the RUDs for the ICCPR, it 
explained that "U.S. laws permit additional distinctions . . . between 
citizens and non-citizens and between different categories of non-citizens, 
especially in the context of the immigration laws."197  This statement 
                                                                                                                 
 193. Id. at 264. 
 194. Id. at 268. 
 195. See id. at 267 (dismissing petitioner’s contention that other courts have found 
"persuasive" the HRC’s interpretation of a State Party’s adherence to the Covenant under 
Article 41).  The court found instead that the case law asserted by petitioner demonstrated 
that courts could only use the HRC as a guide, not to void U.S. RUDs.  Id.  The Fifth Circuit 
relied on several cases in its analysis, including:  United States v. Bakeas, 987 F. Supp. 2d 
44, 46 & n.4 (D. Mass. 1997) (noting that in this case the dictum of the Massachusetts 
District Court must be dismissed because the only authority cited by that court was a law 
review article in its contention that the HRC has the "ultimate authority to decide whether 
parties’ classifications or reservations have any effect"); United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 
F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2000) (perceiving the HRC interpretation of the ICCPR as "most 
important"); and United States v. Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 1998) 
(noting interpretation of the HRC as merely "helpful"). 
 196. See Beazley, 242 F.3d at 265–67 (rejecting language from the Human Rights 
Committee stating that making a reservation to the execution of children provision would 
nullify the treaty); General Comment 24, General Comment on Issues Relating to 
Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional 
Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, paras. 5, 
6, 8, 18, U.N. GAOR Human Rights Comm., 52d Sess., paras. 5, 6, 8, 18, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 1994) (finding that a reservation as to the provision on the 
execution of children would render the entire treaty void). 
 197. United States:  Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the International 
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reinforces the long-standing plenary power doctrine.  Since 1889, the 
Supreme Court has given "extreme deference" to Congress and to the 
Executive Branch on the creation and enforcement of immigration laws.198  
This deference leads federal courts to consistently decline the use of 
heightened scrutiny.  Most courts rely instead on the less stringent rational 
basis standard of review.199 
To date, federal courts rely on the plenary powers doctrine to dismiss 
most FBI name check delay claims.200  Dismissal of these cases is due to 
the United States’ ability to withstand a rational basis standard of review.  
A subsidiary reason involves the dismissal of claims made by non-citizens 
under the equal rights provisions of the Fifth Amendment.201  The rational 
basis standard of review also places a significant burden on the plaintiff to 
overcome the U.S. government’s national security rationale.202 
In addition, federal courts frequently use a rational basis test for FBI 
name check delay claims.203  As one federal court described, the focus on 
FBI name checks is not on deciding whether it is good policy, but is instead 
on deciding whether the policy is rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest.204  Moreover, federal courts also reinforce that it is 
                                                                                                                 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 31 I.L.M. 645, 655 (1992) (emphasis added). 
 198. See generally Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (finding that 
treaties did not infringe on Congress’ power to regulate Chinese immigration); Shaughnessy 
v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (finding that the Court should not second guess Congress’ 
legislative acts on immigration and the Executive’s methods of enforcing those acts); 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1951) (finding that the Court should defer to 
Congress’ judgment in regulating immigration regarding the Alien Registration Act). 
 199. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 (1977) (stating that this Court has "long 
recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute 
exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control"). 
 200. See Recent Mandamus Litigation, supra note 12 (providing a comprehensive up-
to-date list of all recent actions by federal courts regarding FBI name check delay cases 
nationwide). 
 201. See, e.g., Antonishin v. Keisler, 627 F. Supp. 2d 872, 883 (N.D. Ill. 2007) 
(explaining that in this case in which the plaintiff claimed Fifth Amendment violations from 
USCIS delays, there existed no suspect class or otherwise fundamental right; therefore a 
rational basis test would be used).  Note that Antonishin reinforced its reasoning by citing to 
Vision Church v. Village of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 1000–01 (7th Cir. 2006).  See also 
Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).  
 202. See id. (noting the significant level of deference rational basis review grants to 
"legislative determinations").  
 203. See Recent Mandamus Litigation, supra note 12 (highlighting a string of cases 
using this standard of review). 
 204. See Antonishin, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 882–83 (noting that the rational basis standard 
used in this context would be "extremely respectful" to the Immigration and Naturalization 
Act and the plaintiff would have to find evidence that the statute draws a distinction that 
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unlikely that the Immigration and Naturalization Act would ever be struck 
down for FBI name check delays.  FBI name check procedures provide a 
legitimate government interest in safeguarding the United States.205 
VII.  Conclusion 
In 2007, the USCIS experienced the most dramatic increase in 
naturalization applications ever.206  The unexpected surge overwhelmed an 
already burdened process and further highlighted significant flaws and 
offsetting effects of this policy.207  One specific effect was a further 
increase in the processing periods due to FBI name checks for many 
believed to be of Muslim, Arab, Middle Eastern, or South Asian descent.208  
As the NYU Report documented, the processing delays experienced by 
many of these applicants are perceived by many to be both unnecessary and 
extremely detrimental on a personal level.209 
The USCIS has continued to assert that all naturalization applicants go 
through the same screening process regardless of their race, ethnicity or 
national origin since the 2002 inception of FBI name check procedures to 
the naturalization process.210  For most applicants, delays associated with 
this name check process never create an issue;211 but for a small percentage, 
                                                                                                                 
simply makes no sense). 
 205. See id. at 884 ("We do not believe that the presence of an applicant’s name in an 
FBI file is so unlikely to reveal derogatory information that the records search is 
irrational."); see also Omeiri v. District Director, Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration, 
2007 WL 2121998, at *3 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (stating that "[t]he purpose of the background 
checks within context of the Immigration and Naturalization Act is to ensure that only 
worthy applicants are granted the privilege of United States citizenship"). 
 206. Naturalization Delays:  Causes, Consequences and Solutions, Before the S. Comm. 
on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law, 110th Cong. 
2, 7 (2008) (statement of Emilio T. Gonzalez, Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services). 
 207. See id. at 2–9. 
 208. See generally supra note 6 and accompanying references. 
 209. See NYU REPORT, supra note 15, at 2–8 (noting this general theme throughout the 
NYU Report and further documenting specific quotations from the personal effects this 
policy had on naturalization applicants). 
 210. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT 
SHEET:   IMMIGRATION SECURITY CHECKS—HOW AND WHY THE PROCESS WORKS 2 (2006), 
http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/security_checks_42506.pdf. 
 211. See id. at 2 (stating that of the total pool of naturalization applications, in 80% of 
the cases there are no FBI name check matches resulting in delays; and of the remaining 
20%, most of the cases are usually resolved within 6 months.  And further, "Less than one 
percent of cases subject to an FBI name check remain pending longer than six months"). 
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it has produced a substantially longer processing time.212  While the USCIS 
acknowledges this impact of the name check requirement, it maintains that 
it will not "forsake integrity and sound decision making in favor of 
increased productivity, or compromise national security."213 
Conceding that the FBI name check requirement has produced 
substantial personal difficulties for many applicants does not in itself justify 
condemnation of this requirement.  It does, however, necessitate a careful 
analysis of the costs and benefits associated with the existing process, with 
a particular emphasis on the apparent disparate impact on certain groups of 
applicants.  This Note contributes to such analysis by identifying and 
applying the correct international human rights framework to analyze the 
United States’ treaty obligations.214 
Despite the important criticisms contained in the NYU Report, this 
Note concludes that delays caused by the FBI name check process do not 
place the United States in violation of its international obligations under the 
ICCPR or the CERD, nor do these treaties provide any form of meaningful 
redress for applicants subjected to prolonged processing time.  These 
conclusions are based primarily on the United States’ RUDs to each treaty 
and the effects they have on the United States’ international obligations, 
which were the precise considerations omitted from the NYU Report’s 
analysis.215  Factoring these RUDs into the equation indicates the ultimate 
permissibility of the current U.S. naturalization policies. 
Of course, concluding that human rights treaties do not provide a 
meaningful check on the establishment and the implementation of this 
immigration policy does not indicate that it is wise or even morally 
legitimate.  Legality does not necessarily eliminate compelling policy 
reasons to reconsider the name check requirement in light of the 
                                                                                                                 
 212. Id. 
 213. Naturalization Delays, supra note 205, at 6. 
 214. In presenting the foregoing analysis, it is imperative to reinforce that the goal of 
this Note is not in any way to discredit nor disrespect the individuals affected by the FBI 
name check delays.  Nor is this scholarship meant to in any way discredit the excellent work 
done by the NYU Center for Human Rights and Global Justice on bringing this issue to 
forefront of the immigration discussion. 
 215. NYU REPORT, supra note 15, at 25–30 (arguing that the United States’ actions 
violate international law).  The NYU Report does not mention the United States’ 
reservations, declarations, or understandings to the ICCPR or the CERD in reaching its 
conclusion on the United States’ treaty violations; see also infra Part I (explaining that the 
underpinning behind the United States’ use of RUDs is a compromising mechanism that 
enables ratification of HRTs while keeping intact the domestic rights structure under the 
U.S. Constitution.  It also briefly discusses why the United States’ RUDs to HRTs would 
likely not place the FBI name check delays in direct violation of international obligations). 
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unanticipated impact produced by the attendant delays in naturalization 
processing.  However, recent evidence indicates that this impact is 
becoming less problematic:  in June 2009, the USCIS and the FBI 
announced that they had met their goal of eliminating the naturalization 
backlog, hired additional personnel, and refined the name check criteria to 
ensure that ninety-eight percent of all name check requests were completed 
within thirty days, and the other two percent within ninety days.216  These 
developments offer the potential to better align law, policy, and moral 
imperatives, an outcome that should be considered worthwhile by all critics 
of the immigration process. 
                                                                                                                 
 216. Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., USCIS, FBI Eliminate National Name Check Backlog (June 22, 2009), 
http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/NNCP_backlog_elim_22jun09.pdf. 
